Supplementary Materials
to the article

Political conflict in the reform of the Eurozone

*European Union Politics* 20(1)

Thomas Lehner* Fabio Wasserfallen**

Contents

1 Basic Space Scaling 2
2 One-dimensional W-Nominate 3
3 IRT with OUT 4
4 Two-dimensional W-Nominate 5
5 Cutting line of a two-dimensional W-Nominate model 6

*Centre of European Union Studies, University of Salzburg, Austria. Email: thomas.lehner@sbg.ac.at*
**Centre of European Union Studies, University of Salzburg, Austria, Email: fabio.wasserfallen@sbg.ac.at**

URL: [www.fabiowasserfallen.ch](http://www.fabiowasserfallen.ch)
1 Basic Space Scaling

Figure 1 reports ideal points estimated with Basic Space Scaling (Poole, 1998). Basic Space Scaling was developed to map issue scales on one or more latent dimensions and can be applied with the \texttt{blackbox} function in \texttt{R}. We apply this method as a robustness check. Figure 1 plots the findings of the one-dimensional analysis using Basic Space Scaling. The findings are, by and large, the same compared to the IRT estimates presented in Figure 4 of the article with some interesting nuances. For example, the EU institutions are a little closer to the Southern coalition, which is also more homogenous compared to the findings of Figure 5 of the article.

![Figure 1: Ideal points of member states, outcomes, and EU institutions on the one-dimensional space estimated with Basic Space Scaling](image)

Fiscal transfer

Fiscal discipline
2 One-dimensional W-Nominate

We also use W-Nominate as additional robustness check. Figure 2 plots the results of the one-dimensional analysis using W-Nominate (Poole and Rosenthal, 1985). The ideal point estimates support the discussed main findings of the IRT and Basic Space Scaling models (see Figure 4 of the article and Figure [1] of the Online appendix). However, we again find a few nuances. For example, in contrast to the findings of the IRT and Basic Space analyses, W-Nominate identifies Germany and the Czech Republic as most extreme countries on the right end of the spectrum. Also, the Northern and Southern coalitions are more homogenous than in the other two models.

Figure 2: Ideal points of member states, outcomes, and EU institutions on the one-dimensional space estimated with W-Nominate
3 IRT with OUT

We did not include the outcome in the main analysis presented in the article because the outcome is not a position of an actor. However, the position of the outcome is interesting to analyse. To that end, we re-run the Ordinal IRT model, including the outcome. Figure 3 reports the results of the Ordinal IRT model including the outcome (OUT). The findings show that the negotiation outcomes are in the middle, close to the positions of the EU institutions, particularly the Commission.

Figure 3: Ideal points of member states, outcomes, and EU institutions on the one-dimensional space estimated with Ordinal Item Response Theory Model
4 Two-dimensional W-Nominate

Figure 4 reports the ideal point estimates of the positions of EU member states and institutions in a two-dimensional space. The first dimension represents the conflict between advocates of fiscal transfer and discipline, as discussed in the article. Belgium and the Southern EU member states group around the left end of the first dimension, while the ideal points of Northern, Eastern, and Central European member states are located on the right side of the first dimension. The positions on the second dimension do not show a clear divide that would follow any of the theoretical conflicts discussed in Section 2 of the article (on more vs. less integration, left vs. right, or two-dimensions between supporters and opponents of fiscal transfer vs. discipline). Therefore, the empirical findings of the two-dimensional model support the analyses presented in the article.

Figure 4: Ideal points of member states, outcomes, and EU institutions in the two-dimensional space estimated with W-Nominate
5 Cutting line of a two-dimensional W-Nominate model

The cutting line divides the yes from the no votes—or in the case of the legal form of the debt break of the fiscal compact, the countries which favoured a debt break in national constitutions from those who regarded ordinary legislation as sufficient. The cutting line of $12^\circ$ shows that the positions in this issue were not consistent with the divide on the main conflict dimension, as discussed in Section 4 of the article. Member states positioned themselves in this question according to their legal tradition, and their ability to meet the criteria for a constitutional change.

Figure 5: Cutting line of the legal form of the debt break (fiscal compact, see Table 1 of the article)
References
