Online appendix

Contextual variation in interdependent policy making:

The case of tax competition

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A1 Robustness checks

Table 1 presents three robustness checks. The first two sets of robustness checks (I and II) analyze whether the results are sensitive to the choice of the mean as the travel distance estimate for the construction of the spillover variable and the spatial lag. They show the results using the 1st quartile (1Q), instead of the mean, for the construction of the spatial lag (I) and the spillover variable (II), respectively.

The third set of robustness checks (III) reports findings using instrumented spatial lags. Following the literature, I model tax competition as strategic interaction. Accordingly, the cantons' tax decisions affect one another simultaneously, which might bias the estimates because the tax rate changes of canton *i* affect the tax policy making of canton *j*, while the tax rate changes of canton *j* also affect the tax rate changes of canton *i* (Franzese & Hays 2007). A possible fix to the simultaneity bias is the use of instrumented spatial lags. Instrumented spatial lags are estimated using the predicted tax rate of competitors, which are a function of valid instruments ($\mathbf{W}\hat{\mathbf{y}}_t^w$). The equation estimating the predicted tax rates includes as explanatory variables partisan, economic, and fiscal measures, as well as a series of cantonal budgetary

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items – such as agriculture, education, and administration spending.¹ The instruments are strong, as they explain tax rates quite precisely, and they should be valid (Sovey & Green 2011).² A validity concern might be that budget making is influenced by the tax rate changes of competitors. However, the exclusion restriction also holds for the budgetary variables because the tax rate changes of competitors do not *immediately* affect the rather long-term budget planning of Swiss cantons (note that the endogeneity problem is because of the simultaneity bias). At most, they might have some effect on future spending.

Table 1 shows varying-intercept models [1], varying-slope models [2], and cross-level interaction models [3]. The first two sets of models (I and II) use the 1st quartile, instead of the mean, as travel distance measure for the construction of the spillover variable (I) and the spatial lag (II). The models of the third set (III) are specified using instrumented spatial lags. All control variables are included but not shown. Reported are the point estimates, the standard errors, and the significance levels of the spatial lag and the spillover variables, and the interaction of the two (*** p > 0.01, ** p > 0.05, * p > 0.1). Findings are robust to all of these alternative specifications: the spatial lag coefficients are significant, allowing the spatial lag slopes to vary increases the model fit substantially, and the estimates of the cross-level interaction model show that the spillover variable explains part of the variation in tax responsiveness between cantons.

¹Many thanks to Lukas Schmid (University of St. Gallen) for sharing cantonal budgetary data.

 $^{^2 {\}rm The}$ R-squared of the first stage regression is 0.794.

	[1]	[2]	[3]
Spillover (1Q)	-0.660 $[0.456]$	-0.874** [0.409]	-0.604 $[0.433]$
Spatial lag (mean)	0.484^{***} [0.050]	0.506^{***} [0.070]	0.262° [0.147
Spillover * spatial lag			0.103° $[0.056]$
Deviance	933.0	917.2	913.6
Spillover (mean)	-0.965^{*} $[0.543]$	-1.223** [0.480]	-0.900 [0.509
Spatial lag (1Q)	0.473^{***} [0.050]	0.499^{***} [0.070]	0.245 [0.153]
Spillover * spatial lag			0.120° $[0.065]$
Deviance	933.9	916.6	913.0
Spillover (mean)	-0.965^{*} $[0.543]$	-1.265^{***} [0.475]	-0.946 [0.507
Instrumented spatial lag (mean)	0.523^{***} [0.050]	0.540^{***} [0.071]	0.287^{2} $[0.157]$
Spillover * spatial lag			0.120° $[0.067]$
Deviance	918.5	899.0	895.6
N (20 years * 26 cantons)	520	520	520
Varying intercepts	Yes	Yes	Yes
Varying spatial lag coefficients	No	Yes	Yes
Cross-level interaction	No	No	Yes

Table 1: Robustness checks.

I)

II)

III)

A2 Summary statistics

Table 2 shows the summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis. Following the set-up of the presented multilevel model specifications, the variations between and within cantons are separated. Level-2 reports the variation between cantons, which is for all variables the variance of the mean over the investigated time period from 1990 to 2009, except in the case of the spillover variable, which has no time-varying dimension. Level-1 shows the temporal variation of the within-canton transformed variables, which are simply the deviations of the observations from the mean (e.g., $x_{it}^w = x_{it} - \overline{x}_i$).

Variable	Min.	Median	Max.	S.D.			
Level-2 (variation between units, $N = 26$)							
Tax rate	8.203	15.963	18.922	2.611			
Spillover	0.000	2.131	3.637	0.959			
GDP per capita (in CHF)	$38,\!271$	49,793	120,616	$17,\!439$			
Leftist government participation	0.000	0.214	0.430	0.114			
Debt per capita (in CHF)	$3,\!102$	$5,\!104$	$27,\!125$	$5,\!618$			
Population size	14,805	207,642	$1,\!212,\!367$	283,952			
Level-1 (variation over time, $N = 520$)							
Tax rate	-3.303	0.160	1.944	0.894			
Spatial lag	-1.555	0.139	0.817	0.535			
GDP per capita (in CHF)	-23,333	-310.93	$33,\!864$	$4,\!985$			
Leftist government participation	-0.336	0.000	0.236	0.077			
Debt per capita (in CHF)	-1,369	59.00	914.50	201.40			
Population size	-67,467	161.00	120,360	1,644			

Table 2: Summary statistics

References

- Franzese, Robert J. & Jude C. Hays. 2007. "Spatial Econometric Models of Cross-Sectional Interdependence in Political Science Panel and Time-Series-Cross-Section Data." *Political Analysis* 15:140–164.
- Sovey, Allison J. & Donald P. Green. 2011. "Instrumental Variables Estimation in Political Science: A Readers' Guide." American Journal of Political Science 55(1):188–200.